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Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

utility facilities owned and operated by a regional water and sewer
district.
The Utility Clause of the Constitution authorized
municipalities to exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire
existing public utilities. Thus, the court concluded that the City, in
exercising its power of eminent domain over the District's facilities
within its boundaries, acted within the intended purpose of the Utility
Clause. However, a municipality may not exercise its power of
eminent domain over the property of another municipal corporation,
if the municipality's actions would either destroy the existing use or
interfere, leading to destruction of the use. The court broadly
interpreted this limitation making necessary the determination of
whether the proposed appropriation would interfere with the District
to such an extent that it would effectively lead to the destruction of the
District itself.
Although recognizing the existence of substantial evidence
regarding the effect of the proposed appropriation, because neither
the trial court nor the appellate court considered this issue clearly, the
court remanded the case for findings as to the effects of the City's
proposed appropriation of the District property. If the proposed
appropriation would result in the destruction of an existing public use
or the destruction, including economic destruction, of an existing
public utility operated by the District, the appropriation was
prohibited. If no such destructive effect was found, however, the City
would rightfully be exercising its power of eminent domain over an
existing public use.
Lucinda K Henriksen

OREGON
Kinross Copper Corp. v. State, 981 P.2d 833 (Or. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that the state's decision to deny plaintiff's NPDES permit
application did not effect an uncompensated taking of plaintiff's
unpatented mining claims).
In 1975, Amoco Minerals Company ("Amoco") staked unpatented
mining claims in the North Santiam River Subbasin in the Willamette
In 1977, the Oregon Environmental Quality
National Forest.
Commission ("EQC") promulgated the Three Basin Rule prohibiting
any new or increased waste discharges to the North Santiam River
Subbasin.
In 1989, Amoco leased the unpatented mining claims to the
plaintiff, Kinross Copper Corporation ("Kinross"). Two years later,
Kinross developed a plan of operations for a copper ore mining
project. The plan required Kinross to discharge wastewater and
groundwater pumped from the mine into the North Santiam
Subbasin. The plan included obtaining a National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System ("NPDES") permit under applicable state and
federal laws.
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In 1992, Kinross submitted an application for an NPDES permit to
the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality ("DEQ"). The
DEQ concluded that: (1) the discharge would not violate applicable
water quality standards; (2) no viable alternatives to discharging the
wastewater from the proposed mining operation existed; and (3)
without the NPDES permit, Kinross would be unable to develop and
operate its proposed copper mine. In 1995, however, the DEQ denied
the Kinross's application for an NPDES permit since the Three Basin
Rule prohibited any new discharges into the North Santiam River
Subbasin.
Kinross then brought inverse condemnation claims against the
state. Kinross alleged the state's denial of Kinross's permit application
reduced the value of its mining claims to zero, and constituted a
compensable taking under both the state and federal constitutions.
The state argued that because unpatented mining claims are subject to
state regulation, the plaintiff never had the right to develop its mining
claim in violation of state law.
The trial court entered judgment for the state. The court held
that the state's permit denial did not constitute a taking because
unpatented mining claims constitute a unique form of property right.
The court reasoned that this unique property right was subject to state
and federal regulations and was more appropriately analogized to a
contract right than subject to a condition subsequent.
On appeal, Kinross argued that the trial court erred by concluding
that the state was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and that
Kinross' property was not taken under the state or federal
constitutions. In analyzing this issue, the court stated that two settled
principles of takings law applied. First, the court recognized that
under both state and federal constitutions, government actions
depriving property of all value without compensation is an
unconstitutional taking. Thus, the court found that under both the
Oregon and federal constitutions, property owners could maintain an
action for inverse condemnation against a government agency that has
taken action depriving the owner of all economically beneficial use of
the property.
The second applicable principle of takings law was that
governmental action could not be a taking if what the government
prohibited did not amount to a private property right in the first place.
Looking to United States Supreme Court precedent, the Oregon court
explained that regulations that deprive land of all economically
beneficial use will not give rise to takings liability if the inquiry into the
nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests
were not originally part of his title.
Kinross argued that it suffered a taking because it was denied the
right to mine copper as otherwise permitted by its unpatented mining,
claims. The court explained that the EQC did not prohibit Kinross
from mining, but rather prohibited the plaintiff from discharging
wastewater into the North Santiam River Basin. The court further
explained that Kinross carried the burden to show that it had a right to
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discharge wastewater into a state river. If Kinross did not have the
right to discharge water into the river basin, then Kinross could not
complain that it suffered an uncompensated taking.
Kinross then argued that EQC's denial of a permit to discharge
mining wastewater constituted a deprivation of a private property
right. The court stated that, historically, rights to use water in mining
operations were obtained as an incident of mining activity and that
competing claims to the use of the water was determined by the time
of actual appropriation of the water for use. The court noted that
Congress first recognized the rule of prior appropriation in the
Mining Act of 1866. The statute stated that rights to use water for
mining, obtained by prior possession, which are vested and recognized
by the local customs, laws, and decisions of the courts, shall be
maintained and protected. Further, the court noted that although the
basic grant of unpatented mining claims originated in the Mining Law
of 1872, that law did not change the preexisting recognition of state
water rights rules pertaining to mining claims. However, the Desert
Land Act of 1877 did. The Oregon Court of Appeals held that, in
enacting the Desert Land Act of 1877, Congress effectively severed title
to all pubic land, not just desert lands, from title to the nonnavigable
waters on that land.
Moreover, in 1909, Oregon adopted the doctrine of prior
appropriation and established a comprehensive permit system for
appropriating water. Under the rule of prior appropriation, water
rights were determined not as an incident of land ownership, but as a
function of actual diversion of water to a recognized beneficial use.
Thus, the court found that no water rights were granted as part of an
unpatented mining claim. Water rights must be obtained as provided
in the water rights of the state in which the site of the claim is located.
Kinross next asserted that under current state water law, it was
entitled to use up to 5,000 gallons of ground water without a permit.
The court found that the Oregon statute permitted consumption of
ground water, but did not permit the discharge of anything into a state
river.
Finally, the court found that Kinross's takings claim was predicated
on the loss of the right to discharge mining wastes into the waters of
the state. Because this was a right Kinross never possessed, the court
held that the state's NPDES permit denial did not constitute an
uncompensated taking of property. Thus, the court affirmed the trial
court's rulings.
Kris A. Zumalt

